




AUTOMATION AND DIGITALIZATION

NAF TURNEX PNEUMATIC ACTUATORS



SAFETY MANUAL



ANDRITZ

ENGINEERED SUCCESS

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1 Introduction

1.1 SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE SAFETY MANUAL

This safety manual provides the information necessary to design, install, verify and maintain a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) utilizing the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator. This manual provides necessary requirements to enable the integration of the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator when showing compliance with the IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 functional safety standards.

This Safety Manual indicates all assumptions that have been made on the usage of the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator. If these assumptions cannot be met by the application, the SIL capability of the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator may be adversely affected.

1.2 SKILL LEVEL REQUIRED

System design, installation and commissioning, and repair and maintenance shall be carried out by suitably qualified personnel.

1.3 TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Basic Safety	Freedom from unacceptable risk of harm.
BPCS	Basic Process Control System - a system which responds to input signals from the process, its associated equipment, other programmable systems and/or an operator and generates output signals causing the process and its associated equipment to operate in the desired manner but which does not perform any safety instrumented functions with a claimed SIL ≥ 1 .
Fail-safe State	State where solenoid valve is de-energized and spring is extended.
Fail Annunciation Detected	Failure that does not cause a false trip or prevent the safety function but does cause loss of an automatic diagnostic and is not detected by another diagnostic.
Fail Annunciation Undetected	Failure that does not cause a false trip or prevent the safety function but does cause loss of an automatic diagnostic or false diagnostic indication.
Fail Dangerous	Failure that does not respond to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the fail-safe state).
Fail Dangerous Detected	Failure that is dangerous but is detected as part of partial valve stroke testing.
Fail Dangerous Undetected	Failure that is dangerous and that is not detected as part of partial valve stroke testing.
Fail No Effect	Failure of a component that is part of the safety function but that has no effect on the safety function.
Fail Safe	Failure that causes the valve to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process.
FMEDA	Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis.
Functional safety	Part of the overall safety relating to the process and the BPCS which depends on the correct functioning of the SIS and other protection layers.
HFT	Hardware Fault Tolerance.
Low demand	Mode of operation, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than twice the proof test frequency.
MOC	Management Of Change - specific procedures often done when performing any work activities in compliance with government regulatory authorities.
PFD AVG	Average Probability of Failure on Demand.
PVST	Partial Valve Stroke Test.
SFF	Safe Failure Fraction - fraction of the overall random failure rate of a device that results in either a safe failure or a detected dangerous failure.

SIF	Safety Instrumented Function - safety function with a specified SIL which is necessary to achieve functional safety. Typically a set of equipment intended to reduce the risk due to a specified hazard (a safety loop).
SIL	Safety Integrity Level - discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems. SIL 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; SIL 1 has the lowest.
SIS	Safety Instrumented System - instrumented system used to implement on or more safety instrumented functions. An SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).

1.4 PRODUCT SUPPORT & SERVICE

Please refer to the contact information on the back cover of this document.

1.5 RELATED DOCUMENTS

Hardware documents:

Fk 74.59, Turnex Pneumatic Actuator Datasheet
Fi 74.59 Turnex Pneumatic Actuator Maintenance and installation instructions

Guidelines/References

FMEDA report - NAF 07/07-21 R002

1.6 REFERENCE STANDARDS

IEC 61508-2: 2010, Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems

IEC 60654-1:1993-02, second edition, Industrial-process measurement and control equipment - Operating conditions - Part 1: Climatic condition.

2 Turnex Pneumatic Actuator Description

NAF pneumatic actuators are designed for 90° rotation, and the actuator delivers its maximum torque in the closed position (0°) of the valve, which

is normally the position in which maximum torque is needed for ball, ball sector and butterfly valves.

- intended for both on/off and control.
- internal air passages - no external pipes.
- limit position adjustments in both directions of travel maintenance-free.
- double-acting or single-acting, with spring return.
- includes provision for direct-mounting of valve.
- positioner, solenoid valve and limit position switches.
- piston rod mounted in PTFE bearings for smooth operation.
- flexible system of sleeves for different stem diameters.

3 Designing a SIF Using the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator

3.1 SAFETY FUNCTION

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuators are typically used with other interface components (valve positioner or solenoid valve) and a valve to provide a final element subassembly for a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). The safety function for the actuator and valve and any additional components in the subsystem is to move the valve to the safe position (which can be either open or closed as required) within the specified safety time when the system is tripped.

3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL LIMITS

The designer of the SIF must check that the product is rated for use within the expected environmental limits, maximum working pressure and temperature. Refer to the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator datasheet for this information.

3.3 APPLICATION LIMITS

The materials of construction of a Turnex Pneumatic Actuator are specified in the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator datasheet. It is especially important that the designer of the SIF checks for material compatibility considering on-site chemical contaminants and air supply conditions. If the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator is used outside the application limits or with incompatible materials, the reliability data and predicted SIL capability becomes invalid.

3.4 DESIGN VERIFICATION

A detailed Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA) report is available from NAF AB for this product. This report details all failure rates and failure modes as well as expected lifetime of the product.

The achieved Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of an entire Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) design must be verified by the designer via a calculation of PFDAVG considering the architecture, proof test interval, proof test effectiveness, any automatic diagnostics, average repair time and the specific failures rates of all equipment included in the SIF. Each subsystem must be checked to assure compliance with minimum Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) requirements. The exida exSILentia™ tool is recommended for this purpose as

it contains accurate models for the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator and its failure rates.

When using the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator in a redundant configuration, a common cause factor of at least 5% should be included in the safety integrity calculations.

The failure rate data listed in the FMEDA report is only valid for the useful lifetime of the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator. The failure rates will increase after this useful lifetime period has expired. Reliability calculations based on the data listed in the FMEDA report for mission times beyond the lifetime may yield results that are too optimistic, i.e. the calculated SIL will not be achieved.

3.5 SIL CAPABILITY



3.5.1 SYSTEMATIC INTEGRITY

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator has met manufacturer design process requirements of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3. These are intended to achieve sufficient integrity against systematic errors of design by the manufacturer. A Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) designed with this product must not be used at a SIL higher than the statement without "prior use" justification by the end user, or verification of diverse technology in the design.

3.5.2 RANDOM INTEGRITY

According to IEC 61508 the architectural constraints of an element must be determined. This can be done by following the 1H approach according to 7.4.4.2 of IEC 61508 or the 2H approach according to 7.4.4.3 of IEC 61508.

The 1H approach involves calculating the SFF for the entire element.

The 2H approach involves assessment of the reliability

data for the entire element according to 7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508.

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator is classified as a device that is part of a Type A element according to IEC 61508, having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator can be classified as a 2H device when the failure rates listed in the FMEDA report are used for the Design Verification calculations. When 2H data is used for all of the devices in an element, then the element meets the hardware architectural constraints up to SIL 2 at HFT=0 (or SIL 3 @ HFT=1) per Route 2H. If Route 2H is not applicable for the entire final element, the architectural constraints will need to be evaluated per Route 1H.

When the final element assembly consists of several components additional to Turnex Pneumatic Actuator, the SIL must be verified for the entire assembly using the failure rates of all components. This analysis must account for architectural constraints by comparing both SFF and HFT with IEC61508-2, Table 2 if following Route 1H.

3.5.3 SAFETY PARAMETERS

For detailed failure rate information refer to the FMEDA report for the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator.

3.6 CONNECTION OF THE TURNEX PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR TO THE SIS LOGIC SOLVER

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator should be connected to a safety rated logic solver which is actively

performing the safety function as well as automatic diagnostics (if any) designed to diagnose potentially dangerous failures within the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator, (i.e. partial valve stroke test).

3.7 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

The system and function response time shall be less than the process safety time. The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator will move to its defined safe state in less than this time with relation to the specific hazard scenario.

All SIS components including the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator must be operational before process start-up.

The User shall verify that the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator is suitable for use in safety applications by confirming the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator nameplate and model number is properly marked.

Personnel performing maintenance and testing on the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator shall first be assessed as being competent to do so.

Results from periodic proof tests and partial valve stroke tests (if any) shall be recorded and periodically reviewed.

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator shall not be operated beyond the useful lifetime as listed in paragraph 5.3 without undergoing overhaul or replacement.

4 Installation & Commissioning

4.1 INSTALLATION

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator must be installed per the standard practices outlined in the Maintenance and Installation Instructions.

The environment must be checked to verify that environmental conditions do not exceed the ratings.

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator must be accessible for physical inspection.

4.2 PHYSICAL LOCATION AND PLACEMENT

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator shall be accessible with sufficient room for pneumatic connections to the

actuator and shall allow for manual proof testing to take place.

The Turnex Pneumatic Actuator shall be mounted in a low vibration environment. If excessive vibration can be expected then special precautions shall be taken to ensure the integrity of pneumatic connectors or the vibration should be reduced using appropriate damping mounts.

4.3 PNEUMATIC CONNECTIONS

Pneumatic piping to the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator shall be kept as short and straight as possible to minimize airflow restrictions and potential clogging. Long or kinked pneumatic tubes may also increase valve closure time.

Only dry instrument air filtered to 50 micron level or better shall be used.

The process air pressure shall meet the requirements set forth in the actuator installation manual.

The process air capacity shall be sufficient to move the valve within the required time.

5 Operation & Maintenance

5.1 PROOF TEST REQUIREMENT

During operation, a low demand mode SIF must be proof tested. The objective of proof testing is to detect failures within the equipment in the SIF that are not detected by any automatic diagnostics of the system. Of main concern are undetected failures that prevent the SIF from performing its function.

Periodic proof tests shall take place at the frequency (or interval) defined by a SIL verification calculation. The proof tests must be performed more frequently than (or as frequently as) specified in the SIL verification calculation in order to maintain the required safety integrity of the overall SIF. Results from periodic proof tests and partial valve stroke tests (if any) shall be recorded and periodically reviewed.

For detailed Proof Test information refer to the FMEDA report for the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator.

5.2 REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT

Repair procedures outlined in the Maintenance and Installation Instructions must be followed.

5.3 USEFUL LIFE

Based on general field failure data and a low demand mode of operation, a useful life period of approximately 10 to 15 years is expected for the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator.

For high demand mode applications, the useful lifetime of the mechanical parts is limited by the number of cycles. The useful lifetime of the mechanical parts is > 10,000 full scale cycles or 8 to 10 years, whichever results in the shortest lifetime.

5.4 NOTIFICATION OF FAILURES

In case of malfunction of the system or SIF, the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator shall be put out of operation and the process shall be kept in a safe state by other measures.

NAF AB must be informed when the Turnex Pneumatic Actuator is required to be replaced due to failure. The occurred failure shall be documented and reported to ANDRITZ NAF representative or directly to NAF AB using the contact details on the back cover of this safety manual.



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